docs: clarify capsicum worker limitation

ober

b3e3c6aebfe9c0bf5e0820aaec8145d22300cdda

diff --git a/docs/kimi3-security-recommmendations.md b/docs/kimi3-security-recommmendations.md
index 59c6d95..bb3592d 100644
--- a/docs/kimi3-security-recommmendations.md
+++ b/docs/kimi3-security-recommmendations.md
@@ -1297,8 +1297,9 @@ fake confidence happens.
   smallest kernels).
 - No FIPS 140-3 / Common Criteria evaluation.
 - No covert-channel analysis; Chez GC is a timing side channel (P3-07).
-- Seccomp tables cover x86_64/aarch64 only; Landlock needs Linux 5.13+;
-  Seatbelt/Capsicum have thinner test coverage (P1-08).
+- Seccomp tables cover x86_64/aarch64 only; Landlock needs Linux 5.13+.
+  Linux/macOS/FreeBSD sandbox smoke coverage is wired, but FreeBSD Capsicum is
+  limited to the standard worker-eval helper until an fd-exec launcher exists.
 - Safe-prelude file/shell/delete sink names now check taint, env/file content
   reads are source-tainted by default, Ring HTTP request fields and
   WebSocket/fiber WebSocket payloads are source-tainted at the documented